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Given the importance of family firms all over the world, our main objective is to study 
whether ownership concentration in the hands of family owners contributes to increase the 
market value of the firm. Additionally, we analyze whether family firms outperform non-
family corporations. The estimation of our models by using the Generalized Method of 
Moments provides interesting results. We find that family ownership positively impacts on 
firm value. Nevertheless, when ownership concentration in the hands of the family is too 
high, firm value decreases; thus giving rise to a non-linear relation between family ownership 
concentration and firm value. Moreover, our results show that young family firms perform 
better than old ones. Finally, we find that family firms are superior performers to non-family 
ones, even when nonlinearities are taken into account; but the better performance is primarily 
due to young family corporations. Overall, the empirical evidence provided supports a 
positive impact of family ownership on firm value, supporting the idea that family control 
may be beneficial to minority shareholders. 
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The importance of family firms throughout the world has motivated abundant 
theoretical and empirical literature, as highlighted in recent studies (Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella, 2007; Martikainen, Nikkinen and Vähämaa, 
2008). In this respect, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) document 
that family control is the most widespread form of organizational structure 
except in countries with strong protection of minority shareholders. This finding 
runs contrary to the Berle and Means’ (1932) image of the modern corporation, 
in which ownership is dispersed among minority investors and control is 
concentrated in the hands of the managers. When theoretically modelling the 
evolution of family firms, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) also stress the 
predominance of family businesses. They argue the importance of family firms 
in the initial stages of a country’s economic development and their still 
significant role in all countries as capital markets develop. Additionally, Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) highlight the pervasiveness of family firms in 
most economies, paying special attention to the concentration of corporate 
control in the hands of very wealthy families and the rarity of ownership 
dispersion. 
With respect to the predominance of family firms in particular regions of 
the world, control by a family appears to be common among large U.S. 
companies (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Gadhoum, Lang and Young, 2005) as well as among corporations that operate in 
Western European countries (Gallo and García Pont, 1989; Franks and Mayer, 
2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Additionally, several studies document the 
importance of family firms in the East Asian region (Mok, Lam and Cheung, 
1992; Lam, Mok, Cheung and Yam, 1994; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). 
Despite the prevalence of family firms in many countries and despite the 
influence of family owners throughout the world (even in the most developed 
economies, such as the Western European or the American), the evidence on the 
effect of family ownership on corporate performance is still scarce. There are, 
however, some recent papers that provide empirical evidence on this issue, and 
others that analyze different aspects related to family firms. Nevertheless, their 
results are inconclusive as to whether family control is beneficial or detrimental 
to minority shareholders. 
On the one hand, there is a stream of literature that points out to potential 
benefits of family control and supports a positive effect of this type of 
organizational structure on corporate performance. Specifically, several papers 
find a positive relationship between both family control and family ownership, 
and different measures of corporate performance. In the U.S., McConaughy, 
Walker, Henderson and Mishra (1998), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 




circumstances family ownership and control have a positive impact on firm 
performance. According to Martikainen, Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2008) this 
positive effect of family ownership and control is in part due to the higher 
productivity of U.S. family firms in relation to non-family ones. In line with 
these results, Maury (2006) and Barontini and Caprio (2006) find that family-
controlled companies perform better as compared to non-family corporations in 
Western Europe, whereas Chang and Shin (2007) provide empirical results 
against the possibility of wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling families in Korean conglomerates. 
On the other hand, several investigations empirically show a negative 
impact of family control on minority shareholders’ wealth, thus contradicting 
the conclusions reached in the aforementioned studies and questioning the 
positive effects of ownership concentration in the hands of the family. For 
example, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) conclude that 
only “lone founder businesses” perform better than other U.S. public 
corporations, while “true family businesses” do not show superior market 
valuations1. With respect to Western Europe, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) and 
Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schone (2005) find that family ownership can be 
detrimental for minority shareholders in Sweden and Norway, respectively. 
Additionally, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) conclude that controlling families 
in East Asian corporations are in a better position to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders than in Western Europe, suggesting that family ownership 
does not always benefit minority shareholders. 
In this scenario of conflicting evidence, it is our main objective to 
investigate how ownership concentration influences firm value in the particular 
case of family firms. In addition to studying whether family ownership 
concentration and firm value are positively or negatively related, we 
contemplate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between both variables. 
We then take into account the moderating role of firm age in the ownership-
performance relationship, since recent studies suggest that family firms differ in 
corporate performance depending on this characteristic. Finally, we analyze the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value comparing family 
firms to non-family ones. Furthermore, we consider the possibility of 
nonlinearities and the moderating role of firm age when determining whether 
family firms perform better than non-family corporations. 
                                                 
1 These authors define “lone founder businesses” as those in which an individual is one of the 
company’s founders and is also a manager or a large owner, with no other family members 
involved; whereas “true family businesses” are those that include multiple family members as 




To achieve the objectives of our investigation, we have developed three 
empirical models that are estimated by using data on the family firms in our 
sample. We then propose three additional models that are estimated by using the 
whole sample, which allows us to analyze the ownership-performance 
relationship comparing family firms to non-family ones. To empirically test our 
hypotheses, we use a unique sample of listed companies from Western Europe 
for which we were able to obtain valuable data of three different types. First, 
information related to the market value of the company, needed to calculate the 
dependent variable of our models. Second, data on the owners of the firm, 
specifically whether or not they are individuals or families as well as their stake 
in the company, both essential to analyze the impact of family control on 
corporate performance. And third, the composition of the firms’ financial 
statements to be able to calculate a set of control variables that will enter the 
right-hand side of our models. 
With respect to the estimation methodology, our choice has been 
motivated by the importance of taking into account two important problems that 
arise when studying the impact of the firm’s ownership structure on its market 
valuation, namely the unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity 
problems. In regard to the former, family firms have several individual 
characteristics that make them different from other organizational structures. 
Furthermore, every firm (and especially family firms) has its own specificity 
that gives rise to a particular behaviour closely linked to the culture of the 
company, which in family firms is imposed by the owner family. Consequently, 
the firm’s unobservable heterogeneity must enter the models since it could 
impact on firm value. In regard to the latter, several studies highlight the 
potential endogeneity of ownership concentration, which may seriously affect 
the ownership-performance relationship. We thus use panel data methodology to 
eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity, and estimate our models by using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity. 
Our study contributes to the existing finance and management literature in 
several different ways. First, we provide empirical results on one of the main 
corporate governance mechanisms that influences firm value (i.e., ownership 
structure), considering not only the level of ownership concentration but also the 
identity of the controlling shareholder. Second, we contribute to the existing 
controversy about the benefits and costs of family control by taking into account 
the possibility of nonlinearities between family ownership concentration and 
firm value. Third, we go more deeply into the influence of family control on the 
ownership-performance relationship by accounting for firm age and by 
comparing family firms with non-family corporations. Fourth, our estimations 
are performed using a unique sample representative of the different institutional 




ownership data difficult to get for a large number of corporations. And fifth, our 
estimation method eliminates unobservable heterogeneity and controls for 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables in a more efficient way than previous 
studies that analyze the firm’s ownership structure and its impact on corporate 
performance as well. 
By testing our hypotheses, we provide empirical evidence supporting 
previous literature that argues that family control is beneficial for minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, we find a non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration in the hands of the family and firm value, as pointed out in 
previous studies. This suggests that there is a level of family ownership 
concentration at which family control begins to be negative in terms of value 
creation, due to the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. Additionally, 
we can assert that firm age plays an important moderating role in the analyzed 
relationship given that young family firms seem to perform better than old ones. 
Finally, with respect to the comparison between family and non-family 
corporations, our results confirm that family firms are better performers than 
non-family ones in Western Europe, which is consistent with the potential 
benefits of having a controlling family in the company. Furthermore, family 
firms continue to outperform non-family ones after controlling for both 
nonlinearities and the moderating role of firm age. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The second section 
reviews previous literature and empirical evidence related to family control, and 
presents our hypotheses and models. Section 3 describes the data and estimation 
method used in our analysis. The results are discussed in Section 4 and the last 
section highlights our conclusions. 
 
2. Theory, hypotheses and empirical models 
 
2.1. Ownership concentration and firm value: the particular case of family 
firms 
Berle and Means (1932) already suggested the importance of ownership 
concentration as a means to alleviate the agency problems between owners and 
managers in the modern corporation. They pointed out to the existence of a 
positive impact of ownership concentration on corporate performance since 
dispersion of ownership creates free riding problems and hinders managers’ 
monitoring. A few decades later, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) confirmed the 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, which 
implies that the classic owner-manager problem can be in part resolved by 
monitoring and control activities on the part of large shareholders. Consistent 
with a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance, 




do not perform poorly relative to widely held corporations, and show that they 
survive over time. These findings contradict the hypothesis that ownership 
concentration in the hands of large shareholders is motivated by wealth 
expropriation or consumption of corporate resources. In favour of a positive 
effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) mention that large shareholders address the agency problem between 
owners and managers in that they have a great interest in profit maximization. 
Moreover, although evidence from all over the world suggests that ownership 
structure influences firm performance in different ways depending on the 
country and the blockholder identity, concentrated ownership most often has a 
positive effect on firm value (Denis and McConnell, 2003). In fact, block 
ownership helps to mitigate agency costs (Chen and Yur-Austin, 2007), thus 
contributing to value creation. 
In the framework of the aforementioned literature, which suggests that 
ownership concentration contributes to increase the market value of the firm, our 
first objective is to empirically analyze whether this positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance also applies to the 
case of family firms. In this respect, family owners are especially motivated to 
monitor professional managers, which may help alleviate the free riding 
problem that exist in widely held corporations (Lee, 2006; Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2006), and might explain a positive relationship between family 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Moreover, several arguments in 
favour of a positive relationship between family ownership concentration and 
corporate performance have already been proposed by previous theoretical and 
empirical research. 
First, family owners are more interested in firm survival and they often 
focus on longer horizons than other categories of large shareholders because 
they worry about the continuity of their company and contemplate it as an asset 
to bequeath to the next generation (Lee, 2006). The extended horizons of family 
firms may induce them to invest following criteria that maximize the value of 
the company, thus benefiting minority shareholders (James, 1999; McVey and 
Draho, 2005). In line with this argument, the sustained presence of family 
owners in the company and their longer investment horizons relative to 
managers of widely held corporations are likely to reduce managerial myopia, 
thus leading to better firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Furthermore, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) suggest that the survival 
concern and the lack of diversification of family owners may help to alleviate 
the agency costs between bondholders and shareholders identified by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Likewise, the long-term presence of family members in the 




superior knowledge of the firm’s technology improving firm’s productivity 
(Martikainen, Nikkinen and Vähämaa, 2008). 
Second, the reputation concern and the intention to preserve the family 
name are likely to entail a significant commitment on the part of family owners, 
which may lead to positive economic consequences as already suggested in 
previous research. Family ties and reputation can limit managerial self-dealing 
when family members run the company, thus facilitating firm survival (Denis 
and Denis, 1994). Moreover, family’s reputation may facilitate long-term 
relationships with other stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers and capital 
providers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; McVey and Draho, 2005). Specifically, 
the reputation concern of family owners allows family firms to have a lower cost 
of debt financing and to reduce the conflicts of interests between shareholders 
and bondholders (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003). Additionally, the 
reputation concern of family firms may also be a possible explanation for the 
significant association between founding family ownership and higher earnings 
quality found by Wang (2006) in U.S. corporations. 
Third, agency problems due to the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) may be resolved in family 
firms run by members of the owner family (McVey and Draho, 2005; Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller, 2006). In fact, individual large shareholders usually occupy 
management positions instead of merely monitoring managers (Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988). Furthermore, after confirming that firms with majority owners 
do not underperform, Denis and Denis (1994) conclude that family management 
seems to be necessary for concentrated ownership. Additionally, an owner-
manager with a significant stake in the company, as in the case of family firms 
managed by members of the family, may be beneficial thanks to the alignment 
of interests between owners and managers (Han and Suk, 1998 ; Lemmon and 
Lins, 2003). In short, it is possible to state that owner-managers are frequent in 
family firms and that they may be beneficial as compared to outside managers 
due to their superior knowledge of the company and their particular interest in 
increasing firm value. 
Overall, the aforementioned arguments highlight the benefits of 
ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism and indicate that 
the identity of large shareholders (and more precisely, the differentiation 
between family and non-family firms) may be of great importance in the study 
of the ownership-performance relationship (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). 
Consequently, we aim to analyze whether family ownership, as a particularly 
interesting organizational structure, has a significant effect on firm value. 





Hypothesis 1: Family ownership concentration positively impacts on firm value. 
To test this hypothesis, we have developed the following model: 
itititit XFOCV εφββ +++= 10  (1) 
where Vit and FOCit stand for firm market valuation and family ownership 
concentration, respectively; whereas Xit is a vector of control variables that have 
been usually considered in the literature on ownership structure. Specifically, 
vector Xit includes debt, investment, dividends, size, intangible assets, cash flow, 
return on assets, the firm’s beta, the stake of the second largest shareholder and 
firm age as control variables2. It is worth noting that we only use data on the 
family firms in our sample to estimate this model3. We consider a company as 
being family-controlled if the largest shareholder is an individual or a family 
with at least 10 percent of the company’s voting rights. The idea behind using 
10 percent of the votes is that this is usually enough to have effective control of 
the company. Furthermore, previous papers on ownership structure also use this 
percentage to determine whether companies have a controlling shareholder or 
not (Maury, 2006; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008). 
Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis and based on the potential 
benefits of family control, we have initially proposed a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value in the case of family firms. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a large shareholder in the company can give rise 
to an agency problem different from the classic owner-manager conflict, namely 
the agency problem between controlling owners and minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This agency problem arises when the large 
shareholder uses its controlling position in the company to extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Consistent with this argument, 
several papers find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration 
and corporate performance; positive at low levels of ownership concentration as 
a result of the monitoring hypothesis, and negative afterwards as a consequence 
of the expropriation hypothesis. This functional form can be found in Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro (1998), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Miguel, Pindado and de 
la Torre (2004). 
Besides the empirical evidence showing that ownership concentration is 
non-linearly related to corporate performance, the particular ties of family 
corporations may explain by themselves this non-linearity in terms of the 
potential costs of family ownership. The logic behind this reasoning is that the 
drawbacks of having a family as the largest shareholder of the company are 
more likely to arise when the stake of the family in the firm is too high, 
                                                 
2 For a detailed definition of all variables included in the models, see Appendix A. 
3 That is why the main explanatory variable is family ownership concentration (FOCit) and not 




increasing corporate performance first as family ownership concentration rises 
and then decreasing after a certain level of family ownership concentration 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). There are two main potential costs of 
family ownership which may lead to a negative impact on firm value at certain 
ownership levels. 
The first one is the expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling family, which is consistent with the results provided in the 
aforementioned studies that analyze the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate performance. Additionally, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) argue that controlling families have both the incentive and the ability to 
take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of firm performance when 
their stake in the company is substantial. They also indicate that whereas 
diversified investors are more likely to invest according to market value rules 
that maximize shareholders’ wealth, large concentrated shareholders (such as 
families that own a substantial fraction of their company) may tend to pursue 
other objectives different from the value maximization of the firm, which benefit 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. In fact, family owners may 
prefer to sacrifice efficiency for equity, thus damaging other investors’ interests 
(Lee, 2006). In line with this argument, high levels of family ownership may be 
associated with less efficient investment decisions leading to a reduction in the 
market value of the company (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). The use of control-
enhancing mechanisms by large shareholders, such as family owners, is another 
way to expropriate minority investors, thus reducing the market value of the 
firm (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). This type of control structures that 
separate ownership and control rights may be more detrimental to minority 
shareholders when returns on firm’s investment opportunities are marginal 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
The second potential cost of family control stems from the fact that high 
levels of family ownership concentration are generally associated with a 
significant influence of the controlling family on the management of the 
company. This situation may be connected with greater managerial 
entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001; McVey and 
Draho, 2005). Furthermore, the influence of controlling families on management 
decisions might lead to suboptimal policies in terms of value creation; say, for 
instance, empire-building through value-reducing acquisitions that benefit the 
dominant family (McVey and Draho, 2005). In fact, prior literature suggests that 
large shareholders, such as families with a great stake in the company, will 
ensure that management serves the family interests instead of pursuing the value 
maximization of the company (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), which is in line 
with the argument that managerial blockholders enjoy, to some extent, private 




Taking into account the abovementioned arguments, we propose that 
family ownership may be detrimental to the value maximization objective of the 
company when the stake of the family in the firm is too high.  Therefore, as a 
consequence of nonlinearities between ownership structure and corporate 
performance and due to the potential costs of family ownership, we posit the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a non-linear relationship between family ownership 
concentration and firm value; value first increases and then decreases as the 
stake of the family in the firm rises. 
To test this hypothesis, we extend model (1) by including the square of 
the FOCit variable as an explanatory variable. 
ititititit XFOCFOCV εφβββ ++++=
2
210  (2) 
After analyzing the relationship between family ownership and corporate 
performance and determining the level of family ownership concentration at 
which this organizational structure becomes detrimental for minority 
shareholders, we aim to study whether the impact of family ownership on firm 
value is different depending on the age of the company. More precisely, we 
empirically investigate whether young family firms are better performers than 
old family corporations. The importance of considering this characteristic (i.e., 
firm age) in the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance was already suggested by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). In 
fact, their empirical evidence supports the idea that firm age may play a 
significant role when studying the influence of family ownership on corporate 
performance, and suggests that the positive relationship between both variables 
may be attributable to young family corporations. 
In short, the reasoning to argue that young family firms perform better 
than old ones is that ownership concentration in the latter is in the hands of 
family members that are either less motivated to effectively monitor the 
managers or less skilled to run the company. The reason to classify family firms 
according to firm age and to argue that young family firms and old ones perform 
differently also relates to recent theoretical and empirical research. Specifically, 
the inclusion of firm age as a moderating variable in the relationship between 
family ownership concentration and corporate performance is associated with 
two recently investigated issues, i.e. the succession decision inside family 
corporations and the generation of the family controlling or running the firm. 
With respect to the first issue, old family firms are more likely to have 
faced one of the most controversial decisions inside this type of organizations, 
i.e. the succession decision. If succession is not properly planned, generational 




(Manzano García and Ayala Calvo, 2002; McVey and Draho, 2005), thus 
affecting negatively firm value. Several studies analyze the impact that the 
transition to the next generation has on corporate performance of family firms 
and find significant declines in firm performance surrounding the appointment 
of family managers as opposed to professional managers (Smith and Amoako-
Adu, 1999; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González and 
Wolfenzon, 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). These results support the idea 
that young family firms may outperform old ones, in which it is more likely that 
control has been inherited. The worse performance of old family firms that have 
gone through family succession may be explained by how managers are 
appointed in family firms. Management appointments in these firms may be 
more affected by individual family interests than by other corporate objectives 
(such as value maximization), leading to a decline in firm value post-succession 
(Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). Therefore, taking into account that family 
succession may lead to a reduction in the market value of the firm, and 
considering that inherited control is more likely in old family corporations, it 
seems reasonable to argue that young family firms are better performers than old 
family ones. 
In relation to the second issue, young and old family firms may perform 
differently as a result of the generation of the family controlling or managing the 
company. Family firms controlled or run by the founder may perform differently 
than those in the hands of second or later generations (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Young family firms are generally founder-
run corporations whereas old family firms are more likely to be in the hands of 
second or later generations (Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente and 
Castrillo, 2007). Furthermore, while founders that manage young family firms 
may possess unique valuable skills and experience, as well as the managerial 
talent necessary to run the company, succeeding generations in old family 
corporations may lack such entrepreneurial talent (McVey and Draho, 2005). 
Consistent with this reasoning, we argue that firm age might play a significant 
role as a moderating variable in the relationship we are investigating and, more 
precisely, we propose that young family firms outperform old family 
corporations. 
Overall, the aforementioned arguments and results indicate the importance 
of taking into account firm age when studying the ownership-performance 
relationship, particularly in the case of family firms. Therefore, considering the 
possibility of differences between family firms according to firm age, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between family ownership concentration and 




To test this hypothesis we propose the following model: 
ititititititit XFOCYDFOCYDV εφδβδββ ++++++=
2
22110 )()(  (3) 
where YDit is a dummy variable that equals one if the family firm is young and 
zero otherwise. We consider a family firm as being young when the firm age is 
below the mean value of this variable in our sample of family corporations. By 
using this criterion, we classify a family firm as young when the age of the 
company does not exceed 26 years4. The use of this criterion allow us to argue 
that the young family firms of our sample are mostly in the hands of the first 
family generation, since the duration of one generation in the business is about 
25 years (Lambrecht, 2005). 
 
2.2. Ownership concentration and firm value: comparison between family and 
non-family firms 
In the previous hypotheses we have posited how ownership concentration might 
influence firm value by focusing on the particular case of family firms. It is now 
our objective to go a step forward by analyzing whether family firms perform 
differently to non-family ones. Previous research has already investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance comparing 
family firms to non-family ones. Nevertheless, their results are inconclusive and 
vary depending on the institutional setting, on the definition of family firm or on 
the methodology applied. 
On the one hand, there are several studies that find a better performance 
of family firms relative to non-family ones. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson 
and Mishra (1998) are among the first to show that family firms outperform 
non-family ones in terms of efficiency and market valuation in the U.S. 
Consistent with this result, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that companies with 
continued founding-family presence exhibit significantly better accounting and 
market performance measures than non-family firms. Additionally, Martikainen, 
Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2008) find that family firms are more productive than 
non-family ones. These authors argue that the more efficient use of labour and 
capital resources of family firms as compare to non-family ones (and not the 
differences in the production technologies between them) explains in part the 
higher profitability and valuation of family firms found in previous 
investigations. Consistent with the empirical evidence provided in the U.S. case, 
Maury (2006) and Barontini and Caprio (2006) empirically show that family 
control leads to higher firm valuations and higher profitability in Western 
European corporations. 
                                                 
4 26 years is equivalent to a value of 3.27 of the variable AGE defined in Appendix A. This is 





On the other hand, there is also evidence that family firms do not perform 
better than non-family ones. Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella 
(2007) classify family firms into what they name “lone founder businesses” and 
“true family businesses”5, and find that whereas U.S. “lone founder businesses” 
perform better than other public corporations, “true family businesses” do not 
show superior market valuations. In the same vein but adopting a less restrictive 
definition of family firm, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) and Barth, Gulbrandsen 
and Schone (2005) conclude that family ownership is negatively related to 
corporate performance in Sweden and Norway, respectively. The former 
provides empirical evidence that Swedish family firms are associated with larger 
agency costs and lower market values relative to other ownership structures, 
while the latter concludes that family firms are less productive than non-family 
ones in Norway. Moreover, there is also evidence showing that family 
ownership may be detrimental to minority shareholders when investors’ 
protection is weak (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001; Lins, 2003). 
Considering the aforementioned evidence and consistent with the 
potential benefits of family firms that motivated Hypothesis 1, we intend to 
contribute to the ongoing debate about the performance of family firms relative 
to non-family ones by proposing and empirically testing the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a stronger positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value in family firms than in non-family firms. 
To test our fourth hypothesis, we propose a linear specification that will 
be estimated by using all companies of our sample. Specifically, the resultant 
model is as follows: 
ititititit XOCFDV εφγαα ++++= )( 110  (4) 
where OCit stands for ownership concentration, as measured by the percentage 
of votes in the hands of the company’s largest shareholder. This variable has 
been interacted with FDit, a dummy variable that equals one when a company is 
considered to be family-controlled and zero otherwise6. 
Although we have just posited that ownership concentration (either in the 
hands of a controlling family or not) and the market value of the firm are 
linearly related, several investigations find a quadratic relationship between both 
variables. In fact, there is previous research, closely related to ours, that predicts 
a non-monotonic relationship between ownership concentration in the hands of 
the family and corporate performance when comparing family firms to non-
                                                 
5 For a definition of both terms, see footnote 1. 





family ones. In the U.S., Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that there is a 
breakpoint at which the positive effect of family ownership on corporate 
performance disappears. According to these authors, the breakpoint is reached 
when families own about one third of the company. Furthermore, they propose 
the expropriation hypothesis as a possible explanation for the negative impact of 
family ownership concentration on corporate performance when families’ stake 
in the company exceeds one third of the firm’s outstanding equity. A non-
monotonic relationship between family ownership concentration and firm 
performance is also found by Maury (2006) in the Western European region. 
This author estimates a piecewise linear regression and finds that firm value 
increases at moderate family control levels whereas profitability increases when 
family control over the company is higher. Additionally, Maury (2006) 
concludes that the positive effect of family control is only present in non-
majority-controlled corporations. 
Moreover, the proposition that ownership concentration in the hands of 
the family helps to resolve the owner-manager agency conflict while at the same 
time creating conflicts of interests between controlling and minority investors 
suggests that there may be an optimal level of ownership concentration that 
balances both concerns (McVey and Draho, 2005). This idea points to a non-
linear relationship between the fraction of voting rights owned by the largest 
shareholder and the market value of the firm. 
Consistent with previous studies that find a non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance and considering 
the potential benefits of family owners, we aim to analyze whether family firms 
continue to outperform non-family corporations when nonlinearities are taken 
into account. Therefore, we propose our fifth hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a stronger non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value in family firms than in non-family firms. 
To test this hypothesis, we incorporate into model (4) the square of the 
ownership concentration and its interaction with the family dummy variable. We 
thus obtain the following quadratic specification: 
ititititititit XOCFDOCFDV εφγαγαα ++++++=
2
22110 )()(  (5) 
In the two previous hypotheses, we have focused on whether family firms 
really perform better than non-family corporations. We now go a step forward 
by considering the possibility that the better performance of family firms 
relative to non-family ones is mainly attributable to young family corporations 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). A possible 
explanation for this logic is that founders of family businesses bring unique, 




members have less to contribute to firm productivity and efficiency. This 
argument is consistent with empirical evidence showing that family firms 
controlled by the founder outperform non-family firms, while the same does not 
hold for descendant-controlled corporations (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Barontini and Caprio, 2006). 
Considering the aforementioned arguments and results, we empirically 
test whether young family firms are the best performers of our sample, when 
classifying companies according to their age and to the type of controlling 
shareholder (i.e., family control versus non-family control). As a result of 
differences between family firms according to firm age and due to the different 
performance of family firms relative to non-family ones, we formulate our last 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between ownership concentration and firm value 
is stronger in young family firms than in other firm categories, namely young 
non-family firms and old firms. 
To test this hypothesis, we extend the previously developed quadratic 
model, and propose the following specification: 
ititititititititit XOCYNFDYFDOCYNFDYFDV εφϕλαϕλαα ++++++++=
2
2221110 )()(  (6) 
As can be seen, we have included in the model two dummy variables (i.e., 
YFDit and YNFDit) that equal one for young family and young non-family firms, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. By doing so, we achieve two different 
objectives at the same time. On the one hand, we empirically test whether family 
firms continue to outperform non-family corporations that are their counterparts 
in terms of firm age7. On the other hand, we analyze whether the superior 
performance of family firms as compared to non-family ones is primarily 
attributable to young family corporations. 
 
3. Data and estimation method 
 
3.1. Data 
To test our hypotheses, we need three different types of firm-level data. First, 
the number of outstanding shares and its market price are needed to calculate the 
market value of the company (i.e., the dependent variable of our models). 
Second, we need the distribution of the firm’s equity among its shareholders to 
determine the level of ownership concentration and the identity of the largest 
shareholder to identify family firms (i.e., ownership data to calculate our main 
explanatory variables). And third, the firms’ financial statements are needed to 
                                                 




calculate a set of control variables that will enter the right-hand side of our 
models. We have therefore used AMADEUS database as our main source of 
information. Additionally, some macroeconomic data (such as the growth of 
capital goods prices, the rate of interest of short term debt and the rate of interest 
of long term debt) needed to calculate the variables as explained in Appendix A 
have been extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The main reason for choosing AMADEUS as our main source of 
information is that it is a database containing comprehensive data on market 
valuation, shareholding and financial statements of companies that operate in 
European countries. The AMADEUS database is published by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP), one of the world’s leading electronic publishers 
of business information. BvDEP collects data from over 30 specialized 
information providers to ensure that AMADEUS contains the best available 
information. Moreover, BvDEP has developed a uniform format that maximises 
the availability of financial items across the different countries’ filing 
regulations balanced with a realistic representation of company accounts. The 
format is applied to all companies, thus allowing our cross-country empirical 
investigation. In addition to containing standardised annual accounts, 
AMADEUS provides a unique ownership data set, which we need to test our 
hypotheses. 
Specifically, we have extracted the firm-level information from the “TOP 
1.5 million module” of AMADEUS, which comprises the largest 1.5 million 
corporations that operate in the Eastern and Western European regions. 
Nevertheless, we have restricted our analysis to Western European corporations. 
Furthermore, to have a representative sample of listed companies8 that operate in 
Western Europe, we have focused on countries whose institutional environment 
is classified in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). We thus 
ensure that the different legal systems identified by these authors are represented 
in our sample. In fact, the corporations included in the study operate in 
common-law countries (United Kingdom), French-civil-law countries (France, 
Greece, Netherlands, and Spain), German-civil-law countries (Germany and 
Switzerland) and Scandinavian countries (Finland and Sweden)9. This fact helps 
                                                 
8 The reason for focusing only on listed corporations is that, although a great majority of 
family businesses are small and sole proprietorships, family control can also be found in 
many large public companies (Lee, 2006); and since our main objective is to analyze how 
family ownership affects minority shareholders’ wealth, which is well measured by the 
market value of the company, we have restricted our study to Western European listed 
corporations. 
9 Owing to our strong information requirements, other countries from Western Europe 
contemplated in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (namely Austria, 




us to better generalize our research results, as opposed to the weak applicability 
of the empirical evidence from the U.S. pointed out by Cucculelli and Micucci 
(2008). 
The time period of our study is also restricted by the type of information 
needed to test the hypotheses proposed in Section 2. Particularly, our study 
period ranges from 2000 to 2006 since these are the years for which we were 
able to obtain sufficient ownership data from AMADEUS. Finally, our 
methodology imposes an additional restriction to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity and endogeneity; that is, we need information for at least four 
consecutive years per company in order to test for the absence of second-order 
serial correlation, as Arellano and Bond (1991) point out. We need to test for the 
second-order serial correlation because our estimation method, the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), is based on this assumption. Therefore, our final 
sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 779 companies (4,333 observations) 
for which the information is available for at least four consecutive years between 
2000 and 2006. It is worth noting that our sample comprises 262 companies 
(1,415 observations) classified as family firms. Therefore, about one third of the 
corporations (33.63%) are family controlled. The structure of the total and the 
family firm samples, by number of companies and number of observations per 
country, is provided in Table 1. The main summary statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum) of the variables included in our models are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
3.2. Estimation method 
We used the panel data methodology to estimate our models. This choice was 
motivated by the importance of considering two significant problems that arise 
when studying the impact of a firm’s ownership structure on its market 
valuation, namely the unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity 
problems. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allows us to control 
for individual heterogeneity. This issue is very important in our analysis since 
every firm, and especially family ones, has its own specificity (Giménez 
Sánchez, 2002; Lee, 2004; McVey and Draho, 2005) that gives rise to a 
particular behaviour closely linked to the culture of the company, which in 
family firms is imposed by the owner family. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of 
obtaining biased results, we have controlled for such heterogeneity by modelling 
it as an individual effect, ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first differences 
of the variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, itε , has been split 
into four different components. The first one is the aforementioned individual or 
firm-specific effect, ηi. The second one, dt, measures the temporal or time-
specific effect with the corresponding time dummy variables, so that we can 




component, ci, consists of country dummy variables included to control for 
country-specific effects. Finally, vit is the random disturbance. 
The second issue motivating the use of our estimation method is the 
endogeneity problem. The potential endogeneity of our main explanatory 
variable (i.e., ownership concentration) may seriously affect the ownership-
performance relationship. In fact, ownership concentration may have no 
observable effect on firm performance due to the endogeneity of ownership 
structure (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). Furthermore, as Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicate, it is not clear 
whether family ownership improves corporate performance, or if superior 
performance leads families to maintain their stake in the company. In fact, 
family owners can anticipate more easily the company’s future prospects and 
retain ties to only those firms with positive outlooks. Consequently, endogeneity 
may be a problem that has to be controlled for in our models. Hence, to avoid 
this problem our models have been estimated by using the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM), which allows us to control for problems of endogeneity by 
using instruments.  To be exact, we have used all the right-hand-side variables in 
the models lagged from t-1 to t-6 as instruments for the equations in differences, 
and t-1 for the equations in levels as Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest when 
deriving the system estimator used in our paper. 
Finally, we checked for the potential misspecification of the models. First, 
we used the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test for 
the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The 
instruments used were valid as can be seen in Tables 3 and 4. Second, we used 
the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), in order to test for the 
lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residual. There was 
not a problem of second-order serial correlation in our models as shown in 
Tables 3 and 4 (see m2). Third, Tables 3 and 4 provide good results for the 
following three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance of the time dummy variables; 
and z3 is a test of the joint significance of the country dummy variables. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we present the results of our models paying special attention to 
the impact of ownership concentration in the hands of the family on firm value. 
We first comment on the evidence obtained from the estimation of the value 
models specified to study the relationship between family ownership 
concentration and firm value (i.e., models (1), (2) and (3)). These models have 
been estimated using only data on companies classified as family-controlled. We 
then present the results of the proposed extended models to analyze whether 




value than when there is not a family owner in the company (i.e., models (4), (5) 
and (6)). 
 
4.1. Ownership concentration and firm value: the particular case of family 
firms 
The results of the models estimated to analyze how family ownership 
concentration relates to firm value are provided in Table 3. Columns I and II 
show the results of the linear and quadratic specifications, respectively, whereas 
Column III provides evidence of the moderating role played by firm age in the 
ownership-performance relationship. The positive coefficient of family 
ownership concentration in Column I supports Hypothesis 1. This result is 
consistent with the positive effect of family ownership concentration on firm 
performance found by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006). 
Specifically in family firms, family owners are more motivated to effectively 
monitor the managers when their stake in the company increases. Alternatively, 
if members of the controlling family occupy management positions, they appear 
to be particularly interested in increasing firm value when they own a large 
fraction of the firm. A positive relationship between family ownership 
concentration and firm value is also explained by two potential benefits of 
family ownership suggested in Section 2, namely the extended horizons and the 
reputation concern of family owners. 
Although ownership concentration in the hands of the family appears to 
be positive in terms of value creation, the estimation of model (2) provided in 
Column II of Table 3 suggests that family ownership concentration non-linearly 
impacts on the market value of the company. Particularly, the coefficient on the 
family ownership variable is positive ( 0ˆ1 >β ), and the one on its square is 
negative ( 0ˆ2 <β ). This result is in line with previous investigations that find a 
quadratic relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Miguel, Pindado 
and de la Torre, 2004) and allows us to conclude that this functional form also 
applies to the case of family firms. The logic behind this result is that family 
owners whose stake in the firm exceeds certain level benefit more from 
expropriating minority shareholders than from maximizing the market value of 
the company, thus destroying firm value. 
Finally, Column III of Table 3 shows the estimation results of model (3). 
The positive and negative coefficients of the interactions between the young 
dummy variable and the family ownership concentration and its square, 
respectively (i.e., 01̂ >δ  and 0ˆ2 <δ ) support Hypothesis 3. We can therefore state 
that the relationship between family ownership concentration and firm value is 




owners in young family firms are either more motivated to effectively monitor 
the managers or more skilled to run the company than large shareholders in old 
family corporations. Furthermore, the empirical evidence obtained from 
estimating model (3) confirms the important role of firm age as a moderating 
variable when analyzing the effect of family ownership on corporate 
performance. 
Concerning the control variables, their coefficients are statistically 
significant (except beta and the stake of the second largest shareholder in some 
specifications) and have the same sign and similar size across all the 
specifications in Table 3. We find that, on the one hand, firm value is negatively 
related to debt, investment, size, the stake of the second largest owner and firm 
age. On the other hand, we note a positive association between firm value and 
dividends, intangible assets, cash flow, return on assets and the firm’s beta. 
Overall, the results of our analysis with respect to the control variables are 
generally consistent with findings in previous research on the relation between 
family ownership and corporate performance (see, for instance, Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 
2006). 
 
4.2. Ownership concentration and firm value: comparison between family and 
non-family firms 
To compare family firms to non-family ones in terms of corporate performance, 
we have estimated three additional models using all companies of our sample 
(i.e., models (4), (5) and (6)). The results of the estimations are presented in 
Table 4. The estimated coefficients of the linear specification shown in Column 
I provide evidence that family firms are superior performers to non-family 
corporations. Specifically, the positive estimated coefficient of the interaction 
between ownership concentration and the family dummy (i.e., 0ˆ1 >γ ) indicates 
that the impact of ownership concentration on firm value is stronger when the 
largest shareholder is a family than when it is not. This result supports 
Hypothesis 4 and is consistent with previous empirical evidence from the U.S. 
(McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra, 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003) and from Western Europe (Maury, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). 
Moreover, a stronger effect of ownership concentration on firm value when the 
largest shareholder is a family may be explained by the potential benefits 
characteristic of family owners pointed out in Section 2. That is, the extended 
horizons, the reputation concern and the better knowledge of the company on 
the part of controlling families are likely explanations for the better performance 
of family firms relative to non-family ones. 
To test whether family firms continue to outperform non-family 




and obtained the quadratic specification in model (5). The results of estimating 
this extended model are provided in Column II of Table 4. In line with previous 
investigations (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Miguel, Pindado and de la Torre, 2004), the estimated coefficients of ownership 
concentration and its square are positive and negative, respectively. Nonetheless, 
our interest is in the interaction terms between these two variables and the 
family dummy, whose estimated coefficients are also positive and negative, 
respectively (i.e., 0ˆ1 >γ  and 0ˆ2 <γ ). These findings confirm the results from 
estimating model (2) and are consistent with previous empirical evidence 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Moreover, they allow us to conclude that there is a 
stronger non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value 
in family firms than in non-family firms as posited in Hypothesis 5. 
Finally, we classified companies according to their age in order to test 
whether the better performance of family firms relative to non-family ones is 
mainly attributable to young family corporations. As can be seen in Column III 
of Table 4, there is a stronger non-linear relation between ownership 
concentration and firm value in young family firms than in young non-family 
firms (i.e., 11 ˆˆ ϕλ >  and 22 ˆˆ ϕλ < ), thus suggesting that the former outperform the 
latter. This finding has a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, we can assert 
that family firms continue to outperform non-family firms that are their 
counterparts in terms of firm age, consistent with the potential benefits of family 
ownership as opposed to other organizational structures. On the other hand, it 
seems that the better performance of family firms relative to non-family ones is 
to a large extent attributable to young family corporations, which is in line with 
previous empirical results (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Consequently, the estimated coefficients of 
model (6) support Hypothesis 6 and allow us to conclude that family firms 
perform better than non-family ones when both nonlinearities and the 
moderating role of firm age are taken into account. 
As can be seen in Columns I, II and III of Table 4, the estimated 
coefficients of the control variables remain practically identical in sign as in the 
previous three specifications. Therefore, once again we corroborate the results of 
previous studies that also analyze the relationship between family control and 
firm performance with regard to the estimated coefficients of the variables used 
to control for firm-specific characteristics. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines how family control impacts on the market value of a firm 
in an effort to shed light on the issue of whether family firms are really superior 
performers to non-family corporations. To achieve this aim, the analysis of the 




in two steps. In the first part of the study, we estimated three value models using 
only data on the family firms in our sample. In the second part of the paper, we 
estimated three additional models using the whole sample to determine whether 
family firms performed differently to non-family corporations. In each part, a 
linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value was first 
proposed; then the possibility of nonlinearities between both variables was 
contemplated, and finally the quadratic specifications were extended to include 
firm age as a moderating variable. 
Our results show that family ownership impacts positively on firm value, 
probably because of the potential benefits associated to family owners, such as 
their long-term horizons and their reputation concern. These characteristics 
along with a better knowledge of the company are likely to induce family 
owners to invest following value maximization rules. Nevertheless, a more 
accurate analysis reveals that when family ownership concentration is too high, 
firm value decreases. This reduction may stem from the risk of expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the owner family when it owns a large fraction of the 
firm. Regarding the age of family firms, it seems that young family corporations 
perform better than old ones, which may be due to the entrepreneurial talent 
brought by the founders to the company. 
With respect to the different performance of family firms compared to 
non-family ones, we provide empirical evidence that ownership concentration 
has a stronger impact on firm value when it is in the hands of a family than 
when it is not. This result is consistent with the aforementioned potential 
benefits associated to family ownership. Additionally, we show that the stronger 
effect of ownership concentration in the hands of a family holds after controlling 
for nonlinearities. Finally, we find that the better performance of family firms is 
mainly attributable to young family corporations, which perform better than 
young non-family firms and old firms. Overall, our results indicate that family 
firms outperform non-family corporations supporting the idea that family 
ownership may be beneficial to minority shareholders. 
 
Appendix A 
In this appendix we present the definitions and calculations, when necessary, of 
all variables used in our analysis. 
 
Dependent variable 
– Firm value: itV  is calculated dividing the market value of equity by the 




where ititit MPSSOMVE ×=  being itSO  a measure of the firm shares outstanding 
and itMPS  the market price of shares, 
and )( itititit BFTARFK −+=  with itRF  being the replacement value of tangible 
fixed assets, itTA  the book value of total assets and itBF  the book value of 
tangible fixed assets. The latter two have been obtained from the firm’s balance 
sheet and the first one has been calculated according to the proposal by Perfect 
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for 0tt >  and 00 itit BFRF = , where 0t  is the first year of the chosen period, in our 
case 2000. On the other hand, ititit BFBD /=δ  and 11 /)( −−−= tttt GCGPGCGPGCGPφ , 
with itBD  being the book depreciation expense of the firm in year t and tGCGP  
the growth of capital goods prices extracted from the Main Economic Indicators, 
published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). This measure of market valuation has already been used as a 
dependent variable in value models developed in previous studies (see, for 
instance, Morgado and Pindado, 2003; Miguel, Pindado and de la Torre, 2004). 
 
Ownership variables 
– Family ownership concentration: itFOC  is the percentage of common shares 
held by the owner family. 
– Young dummy: itYD  is a dummy variable that equals one if the family firm is 
young and zero otherwise. We consider a family firm as being young when the 
firm age is below the mean value of this variable in our sample of family 
corporations. 
– Ownership concentration: itOC  is the percentage of common shares held by 
the largest shareholder of the firm. 
– Family dummy: itFD  is a dummy variable that equals one if the largest 
shareholder is an individual or a family with at least 10 percent of the votes and 
zero otherwise. 
– Young family dummy: itYFD  is a dummy variable that equals one for young 
family firms and zero otherwise. We use the aforementioned criteria to classify a 
firm as being young and family at the same time. 
– Young non-family dummy: itYNFD  is a dummy variable that equals one for 
young non-family firms and zero otherwise. We use the aforementioned criteria 




difference is that now to determine whether a non-family firm is young or not, 
we use the mean value of firm age in our sample of non-family corporations. 
 
Control variables 







=  where itMVLTD  is the market value of 
















where itBVLTD  is the book value of the long term debt, li  is the rate of interest of 
the long term debt reported in the OECD-Main Economic Indicators and itl  is 
the average cost of long term debt that is defined as )/( ititit BVLTDIPLTDl = , 
where itIPLTD is the interest payable on the long term debt, which has been 
obtained by distributing the interest payable between the short and long term 








where itIP  is the interest payable, si  is the rate of interest of the short term debt, 
also reported in the OECD-Main Economic Indicators, and itBVSTD  is the book 








= −1  where itNF  denotes net fixed assets of 
the firm in year t and  itBD  is the book depreciation expense of the firm 
corresponding to year t. This variable has been calculated according to the 
proposal by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997). 
– Dividends: Since AMADEUS does not provide the value of dividends paid by 






)( 1−−−=  where itNP  stands for net profit of the firm in year t 
and itOSF  denotes other shareholders funds different from capital corresponding 
to year t. 
– Size: )( itit KLnSIZE = . 

















=  where itNP  and itBD  denote the net profit and the 
book depreciation expense of the firm corresponding to year t, respectively. 





ROA = . 
– Beta: itBETA  is a proxy measure of the market risk of the firm calculated using 
the stock data provided by AMADEUS. We have calculated this variable 







BETA = . 
– Stake of the second largest shareholder: itSOC  is the percentage of common 
shares held by the second largest shareholder of the firm. 
– Age: )( iitit INCYEARLnAGE −=  where itYEAR  is the corresponding period of 
time and iINC  is the date of incorporation of the firm. 
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Table 1. Structure of the total and 
family firm samples by country 

















Switzerland 56 7.19 266 6.14 25 9.54 120 8.48 
Germany 78 10.01 407 9.39 33 12.60 169 11.94 
Spain 60 7.70 332 7.66 15 5.73 85 6.01 
Finland 57 7.32 293 6.76 17 6.49 84 5.94 
France 19 2.44 89 2.05 12 4.58 57 4.03 
U.K. 312 40.05 1,834 42.33 68 25.95 396 27.99 
Greece 97 12.45 526 12.14 72 27.48 394 27.84 
Netherlands 53 6.80 337 7.78 5 1.91 29 2.05 
Sweden 47 6.03 249 5.75 15 5.73 81 5.72 
Total 779 100 4,333 100 262 100 1,415 100 
Data was extracted for companies for which information was available for at least four consecutive years 
between 2000 and 2006. The family firm sample was used to estimate models (1), (2) and (3), whereas the 
total sample was used in the estimation of models (4), (5) and (6). Of the total sample, 33.63 % are family 
firms. The percentage of family firms by country in our sample is as follows: 44.64 % family firms in 
Switzerland, 42.31 % family firms in Germany, 25 % family firms in Spain, 29.82 % family firms in 
Finland, 63.16 % family firms in France, 21.79 % family firms in U.K., 74.23 % family firms in Greece, 
9.43 % family firms in Netherlands and 31.91 % family firms in Sweden. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Vit .7755147 .7667635 .0094477 11.83221 
OCit .2377827 .1861315 .0023 .97 
OC2it .0911776 .1422904 .0000 .9409 
DEBTit .0801155 .096938 .0000 .8206548 
INVit .0514904 .0939043 -.8456203 .8495425 
DIVit .0372883 .0920452 .0000 4.372647 
SIZEit 13.02269 1.78898 10.14099 19.37096 
IAit .1152815 .1470127 .0000 .9427326 
CFit .0747769 .0869959 -.9124711 .780748 
ROAit .0599775 .0832049 -.459415 .5491031 
BETAit .8707274 1.143297 -9.866145 18.13789 
SOCit .1015407 .0737581 .0000 .5 
AGEit 3.466118 .9661666 .6931472 6.44254 
Vit is the firm’s value, OCit and OC2it denote ownership concentration and its square, respectively (note 
that FOCit and FOC2it totally coincide with OCit and OC2it, respectively, in the case of family firms), 
DEBTit is the debt ratio, INVit denotes investment, DIVit denotes dividends, SIZEit is the firm’s size, IAit 
stands for intangible assets, CFit denotes cash flow, ROAit is the return on assets, BETAit denotes the 




Table 3. Estimation results of the impact of 
family ownership concentration 

















YDitFOCit   .5491605* 
(.1543903) 






























































z1 1071.64 (11) 1070.80 (12) 495.30 (14) 
z2 552.41 (5) 425.31 (5) 382.86 (5) 
z3 85.19 (9) 77.97 (9) 65.60 (9) 
m1 0.66 0.68 0.61 
m2 -1.21 -1.34 -1.34 
Hansen 232.22 (281) 227.09 (306) 228.05 (356) 
The regressions are performed by using the family firm sample described in Table 1. YDit equals one for 
young family firms and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in Table 2. The rest of the 
information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in 
parentheses. ii) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1 is a 
Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the 
null of no relationship, degrees of freedom in parentheses; z2 is a Wald test of the joint significance of 
the time dummies, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no relationship, degrees of freedom 
in parentheses; z3 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the country dummies, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null of no relationship, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial 
correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of 




Table 4. Estimation results of the comparison 
between family and non-family firms 






















FDitOC2it  -.5902772** 
(.2911808) 
 
YFDitOCit   1.488836* 
(.1832658) 
YFDitOC2it   -2.493983* 
(.3212703) 
YNFDitOCit   .4999708* 
(.1494894) 

































































Table 4. (continued) 
z1 59.43 (12) 70.62 (14) 118.12 (16) 
z2 101.21 (5) 121.19 (5) 156.35 (5) 
z3 16.55 (9) 16.90 (9) 20.17 (9) 
m1 -0.75 -0.77 -0.81 
m2 -0.59 -0.70 -0.76 
Hansen 362.25 (306) 402.09 (356) 457.39 (406) 
The regressions are performed by using the total sample described in Table 1. FDit equals one when the 
largest shareholder is an individual or a family with at least 10 percent of the votes and zero otherwise; 
YFDit equals one for young family firms and zero otherwise; YNFDit equals one for young non-family 
firms and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in Table 2. The rest of the information 
needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1 is a Wald test of the 
joint significance of the reported coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
relationship, degrees of freedom in parentheses; z2 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time 
dummies, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no relationship, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses; z3 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the country dummies, asymptotically distributed 
as χ2 under the null of no relationship, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation 
test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of 
no serial correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
 
